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ABSTRACT 
 
As observed at least in last two decades, financial engineering has not only changed the way of doing business in 
finance world, but also has changed daily life of average citizens in the leading economies. Structured products 
named as weapons of mass destruction in some post-crisis comments. But it is fair to say that few people could 
understand the nature and risks of these instruments before the crisis. By using literature review and case study 
analysis, the author analyses how financial regulation and supervision have failed to understand/manage the 
financial engineering products during/before the global financial crisis. In this context, we discuss the measures 
to enhance good regulatory governance in engineered products. We conclude however engineered products have 
important benefits to the global economy, regulatory/supervisory structure should be improved for better 
firm/system wide risk management. Secondly, there are four components to improve prudential 
regulatory/supervisory framework of structured products. Those are, timely/effectively action to the balance 
sheet problems, to increase the effectiveness of the risk management, to improve independence and quality of 
prudential regulation/supervision and to increase accountability of supervisors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fundamental reason of the subprime mortgage crisis is related to global imbalances among 
countries classified as to save/consumpt more/less. There are also secondary reasons of the 
crisis such as problems of the originate and distribute model, inefficiencies in firm/system 
wide risk management practices, asymmetric information problem, ineffective 
regulatory/supervisory structure of the U.S. financial system etc. However this picture 
reminds us the problems of previous financial crisis/failures, we still need to analyse the new 
financial failure stories. 
 
Problems observed in financial engineering products may be accepted as one of the important 
reasons of the global financial crisis due to various reasons. 
 
These products/transactions seem like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, structured 
products help to improve efficiency in financial markets by reducing the costs of funding. 
Therefore, engineered products help to increase volume of housing credits while reducing cost 
of borrowing. It can be observable that mortgage affordability has improved before the crisis 
due to technological improvements, financial innovations, positive economic environment, 
subsidies, and low cost housing credits. Improving affordability means better 
economic/financial environment to realize American dream which has been at top of the 
agenda of U.S. politicians, households and finance industry. But on the other hand, structured 
finance products were in the center of financial failures during the crisis period. Basically, the 
mechanism of these products was one of the determinants of mipricing the risks in 
primary/secondary mortgage markets. This valuation problem is institutionally related to all 
market participants involving appraisal firms, originators, financial intermediaries (i.e. 
investment banks, mortgage brokers, insurance companies etc.), state/federal level regulators, 
market discipline instiutions (i.e. CRAs, auditors, analysts, accounting firms etc.), investors 
etc. It is not surprise to note that problems of financial engineering are the catalyst in the 
process of subprime and eventually global financial crisis. 
 
By using literature review and case study analysis, the author analyses how financial 
regulation/supervision have failed to understand/manage the financial engineering products 
during/before the global financial crisis. In this context, we discuss the measures to enhance 
good regulatory governance for financial engineering systems.  
 
The paper is organized in five further sections. The paper starts with a discussion of the 
relationship between financial engineering and market fundamentalism. In section three, we 
describe benefits and risks of financial engineering. The fourth section considers global 
financial crisis and regulatory failures related to financial engineering. The fifth section 
reviews problem of regulatory forbearance and determinants of effective regulatory 
framework for financial engineering. And last section is reserved for the conclusion remarks.  
2. Financial Engineering and Market Fundamentalism 
Financial engineering is a practice and can be used only when we define the related 
environment carefully (Neftçi, 2008: 23). The philosophy and/or socio-politic environment 
caused evolving financial engineering products may be defined by some magic liberal words 
involving free market economy, economic freedom, financialization etc. Because the 
approach of ultra liberalisation has impaired regulatory/supervisory systems, one may raise 
the question after global financial crisis whether ―feel free‖ market economy is sufficient 
enough to sustain global economy. 
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In the process of deregulation,] investors became fearless and driven only by greed; 
regulators slept at the wheel, taking comfort from the self-regulating and self-corrective 
capacity of efficient markets. There was an overt display of triumphalism about invincibility 
of Western financial capitalism (Hu, 2010: 31). 
 
In the period of post 2000’s, financial deregulation, shadow banking and also investment 
banking were the rising stars in the leading financial centres. In addition to market players, 
regulators and also politicians do believe the benefits of financial engineering through 
structured products and securitisation techniques. But, according to various observers, free 
market fundamentalism is clearly one of the reasons of global financial crisis. For example,  
Hutton (2010: 33) indicates that this crisis was thirty years in the making – a Gordian knot of 
libertarian free-market fundamentalism, unregulated globalisation, the collapse of social and 
political force committed to fairness, the explosive impact of financial innovations such as 
―securitisation‖, and sheer greed (also, see Levy, 2010: 47). 
 
One may also note that positive market environment have made critical contributions to the 
housing bubble. In this context, federal level housing ownership policies in the US,
1
 interest 
rate policies of FED, specifically between 2003-2007,
2
 various mortgage subsidies and the 
role of GSEs, easy credit policies of mortgage finance institutions, fast securitisation process 
etc. have made housing loans easily accessible to lower income groups/minorities (subprime 
borrowers). In this picture, we may argue that both market environment and government 
policies have provided credit to financial engineering practices.   
3. Benefits and Risks of Financial Engineering 
It has been observed that politicians/bureaucrats in the US did not have reactionary approach 
against financial engineering products because of two reasons. First, not surprisingly, they did 
not exactly understand the risks of structured products. This can be acceptable because even 
highly sophisticated market participants (i.e. CRAs, investment bankers, ―typically‖ many 
board members etc.) couldn’t understand the realities.3 As an interesting comment Pacek 
(2010: 73-74) indicates that a lot of garbage, now commonly refer to as toxic waste, was 
packaged into sexy-sounding names. CRAs happily rated them triple A and unsuspecting 
buyers were told they were buying great stuff that could never fail, was secure and gave a 
good return. 
 
Second, and more importantly, they thought that financial engineering products help to 
improve mortgage affordability. Therefore, they believe that more securitization and hence 
higher volume of low-cost housing credits would make American dream more reliable. Side 
benefits of this process were also fantastic. Thanks to financialization and positive wealth 
effect, this mechanism also created better macro economic environment (i.e. positive real 
economic growth, increasing employment etc.) in the U.S. economy in between 2003-2007 
and hence minimized negative impacts of stock market bubble. If the risks would not 
mispriced in the process of engineering (specifically in the case of securitization) and housing 
                                                 
1
 The housing boom, which got started as early as 1997 and peaked only after ten long years, expressed a 
neurotic obsession with home ownership (Phelps, 2010: 78). Home ownership, may be also related to ownership 
culture of the U.S., has also strong support from politicians and finance sector. 
2
 Lyons (2010: 53) indicates that lower interest rates contributed the collective greed. 
3
 Paradoxically,  this ―total failure‖ story may be already well known from the Enron case. In this regard, Gillan 
and Martin (2002) suggest that management used financial engineering and related-party transactions to disguise 
Enron’s financial condition for over three years. These transactions, board approved, sanctioned by the external 
auditor, and partially disclosed in SEC filings, put the firm on an economic precipice of which few were aware. 
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prices would continue to rise, one may do believe that the above picture might work longer 
time. 
 
The new forms of financial engineering designed to spread and minimise the risks had made 
much greater leverage possible (Bruton, 2010: 9). For example, securitisation and the use of 
credit derivatives were thought to disperse risk in ways that reduced overall risk levels 
(Feldstein, 2010: 17). The financial revolution of the last two decades has registered large 
potential gains in dealing with risk; but most of this gain has been swallowed by the rising 
costs of financial intermediation, made possible by monopoly and asymmetric information 
resources, and generated by escalating marketing and trading expenditures as well as 
extravagant remuneration (Blackburn, 2006: 40-41). While financial engineering can bring 
great rewards to its practitioners, many of its most characteristic devices have nothing to do 
with improved performance, but are all about gaming the taxman or the shareholders 
(Blackburn, 2006: 66). 
4. Global Financial Crisis and Regulatory Failures in Financial Engineering 
The world struggles to cope with capitalism’s near apocalyptical failure (Fernandes, 2010: 
20). It seems that global financial crisis will probably the milestone of everything in the near 
future from finance industry, politics, art market to global poverty.  
 
In many respects, the subprime market experienced a classic lending boom-bust scenario with 
rapid market growth, loosening underwriting standards, deteriorating loan performance, and 
decreasing risk premiums. Argentina in 1980, Chile in 1982, Sweden, Norway, and Finland in 
1992, Mexico in 1994, Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea in 1997 all experienced the 
culmination of a boom-bust scenario, albeit in different economic settings. But, rapid 
appreciation in housing prices masked the deterioration in the subprime mortgage market and 
thus the true riskiness of subprime mortgage loans. When housing prices stopped climbing, 
the risk in the market became apparent (Demyanyk and Hemert, 2008: 32-33). 
 
Most economists and financial analysts identify amongst the main causes of the current global 
financial crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s low interest rates policy (Fed funds) of the latest 
years with the resulting credit euphoria of both lenders and borrowers, the more ‖relaxed‖ 
credit initiation policies and procedures, the overwhelmingly positive expectations on the real 
estate market growth and prices increases, and the massive use of badly controlled innovative 
financial engineering tools (Pezzuto, 2008: 4).  
 
As seen in the new regulations of U.S., the negative impacts of financial engineering have 
accepted as one of important reasons of the crisis. The motives of profit-making, short-
termism and competition are among the essential elements of single/systemic failures occured 
in various mortgage finance institutions during the crisis. But it is equally essential to note 
that regulatory/supervisory agencies from UK to US have also failed during the global 
turmoil. From regulatory point of view, we may argue that lack of efficient 
regulatory/supervisory structure related to engineered products is one the critical reasons of 
the regulatory failure. 
 
Therefore, it is obvious that failures in valuation/accounting/reporting of complicated 
structured products are also related to failures of regulatory/supervisory organisations (See, 
Coskun, 2010: 79). In this context, asymmetric information problem grows in the process of 
global financial crisis due to various reasons. First, lack of sufficient regulatory/supervisory 
measures againts the risks of structured products have caused more risky market environment. 
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Second, informational asymmetry also grows due to lack of sufficient transparency in the 
structured finance products. Third, independent audit firms and also credit rating agencies 
haven’t performed their responsibilities. 
5. Regulatory Forbearance and Effective Regulatory Framework for Financial 
Engineering 
As a general establishment, supervisors and regulators have the ultimate responsibility for 
both firm-wide and industry-wide risk management practices due to their statutory objectives. 
In this context, regulators aim to enhance firm level control and discipline mechanism and not 
only accounting, internal control and internal audit mechanisms but also risk management 
system are also shaped by regulators and supervisors (Coskun, 2007: 56). 
 
It has been long recognized that financial engineering works without effective official 
discipline framework. In other words, regulation/supervision/enforcement tools have not 
simultaneously worked well in the case of structured finance during/before the crisis. To 
regulate some structured products have some limitations,
4
 but it seems that the instruments of 
regulation and supervision have failed in the case of financial engineering.
5
 
 
Existing literature suggests that regulatory problems, also involving regulatory forbearance, is 
one of the biggest issues with previous financial crisis in the U.S. For example, Das and 
Quintyn (2002) suggest that in nearly all financial crises of the past decade-East Asia, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela- political interference in the regulatory and 
supervisory process, forbearance, weak regulations, and supervision have been mentioned as 
contributing factors to the depth and size of the systemic crises. Kawai et al. (2003) argue that 
in the run up to the crisis, East Asian banks developed large asset-liability mismatches—
unhedged foreign exchange borrowings invested in non-tradable sectors and short-term funds 
lent long into property—all of which left the banks vulnerable to exchange depreciations and 
to interest rate surges. This vulnerability reflected the fact that domestic financial systems 
were not well-regulated or governed when capital account liberalization was accelerated in 
the first half of the 1990s. Regulatory and supervisory frameworks over financial institutions 
were weak in risk-management and the capital base—together with loan classification and 
loan loss provisions. Moral hazard was created because of explicit or implicit government 
guarantees to individual financial institutions. 
 
Quintyn and Taylor (2002) emphasize that two factors served to give the need for regulatory 
and supervisory independence greater prominence in recent years. First in almost all of the 
systemic financial crises of the 1990s, the lack of independence of supervisory authorities 
from political influence has been cited as one of the contributing factors to the deepening of 
the crisis. Weak and ineffective regulations –often because politicians block the adoption of 
stronger regulations- weak and dispersed supervision, and political interference in the 
supervisory process leading to regulatory forbearance have been mentioned as major factors 
contributing to the weakening of the banks in the run-up to the crisis, postponing the 
                                                 
4
 For example more transparency in OTC market/derivatives trading may support over reaction and hence 
increase risks of single/systemic failures. Additionally, it is very clear that average financial services consumers 
(and even more sophisticated players) may not easily understand the real risks of the OTC/derivatives 
transactions. On the other hand, financial firms dealing with OTC market/derivatives trading may avoid 
disclosing OTC/derivatives trading information to protect proprietary information, to preserve competitive 
advantage and also to avoid legal problems (Coskun, 2011: 130-131). 
5
 An analysis for the limitations of financial engineering in emerging countries, see, Hill (2000). 
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recognition of the severity of the crisis, and delaying first official and subsequently effective 
intervention. 
 
It is important to enhance accountability of regulators to prevent/minimize regulatory 
problems. Mishkin (2001) points out that supervisor must be accountable if they engage in 
regulatory forbearance in order to improve incentives for them to do their job properly. To get 
supervisors to do their jobs properly, they must also be subject to criminal prosecution if they 
are caught taking bribes and must also be subject to censure and penalties if they take jobs 
with institutions that they have supervised recently. 
 
In this context, we may argue that one of the factors contributing the subprime mortgage crisis 
is lack of efficient regulatory/supervisory framework. In this context, it is observable that U.S. 
regulators haven’t showed effective reaction to the crisis. For example in the case of SEC, it is 
very clear that there was no efficient systemic risk management policies for both financial 
institutions (i.e. hedge funds, investment banks, CRAs etc.) and also financial products (i.e. 
structured products). On the other hand, existing literature also indicates that problems in 
other governmental organisations (i.e. FED, GSEs, FHA etc.) and weaknessess in the 
orchestration of the official discipline system did also impair systemic risk management. 
Therefore, it is specifically clear that riskier lending practices and risks of 
securitized/structured products were not effectively managed by the regulators/supervisors. 
 
In the light of problems observed during the global financial crisis, we may define a 
framework to improve current regulatory system on financial engineering practices. To keep 
the discussion within limits, we will only underline the components of good 
regulatory/supervisory governance for financial engineering products. Das and Quintyn 
(2002) suggest that there are four components of good regulatory governance. These include 
(i) independence of the agency from political and industry interference; (ii) accountability; 
(iii) transparency; and (iv) integrity. In this context, sound prudential regulatory/supervisory 
system may have four components.  
 
1) Timely/effectively action to balance sheet problems of all financial intermediaries. 
2) To increase the effectiveness of the risk management. 
3) To improve independence and quality of prudential regulation/supervision. 
4) To increase accountability of supervisors.  
 
This study does not claim to provide the full picture of relationship between subprime 
mortgage crisis and regulatory/supervisory problems of financial engineering products. But 
we identified room for enhancing regulatory framework for financial engineering. 
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we consider how financial regulation and supervision have failed to 
understand/manage the financial engineering products during/before the global financial 
crisis. In this context, we discuss the measures to enhance good regulatory governance in 
engineered products. 
 
It has been observed that politicians/bureaucrats in the US did not have reactionary approach 
against financial engineering products because of two reasons. First, not surprisingly, they did 
not exactly understand the risks of structured products. This can be acceptable because even 
highly sophisticated market participants (i.e. CRAs, investment bankers, ―typically‖ many 
board members etc.) couldn’t understand the realities. Second, and more importantly, they 
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thought that financial engineering products help to improve mortgage affordability. Therefore, 
they believe that more securitization and hence higher volume of low-cost housing credits 
would make American dream more reliable. 
 
It has been long recognized that financial engineering works without effective official 
discipline framework. In other words, regulation/supervision/enforcement tools have not 
simultaneously worked well in the case of structured finance during/before the crisis. To 
regulate some structured products have some limitations, but it seems that the instruments of 
regulation and supervision have failed in the case of financial engineering. 
In this context, we may argue that one of the factors contributing the subprime mortgage crisis 
is lack of efficient regulatory/supervisory framework. In this context, it is observable that U.S. 
regulators haven’t showed effective reaction to the crisis. For example in the case of SEC, it is 
very clear that there was no efficient systemic risk management policies for both financial 
institutions (i.e. hedge funds, investment banks, CRAs etc.) and also financial products (i.e. 
structured products). On the other hand, existing literature also indicates that problems in 
other governmental organisations (i.e. FED, GSEs, FHA etc.) and weaknessess in the 
orchestration of the official discipline system did also impair systemic risk management. 
Therefore, it is specifically clear that riskier lending practices and risks of 
securitized/structured products were not effectively managed by the regulators/supervisors. 
 
We conclude however engineered products have important benefits to the global economy, 
regulatory/supervisory structure should be improved for better firm/system wide risk 
management. Secondly, there are four components to improve prudential 
regulatory/supervisory framework of structured products. Those are, timely/effectively action 
to the balance sheet problems, to increase the effectiveness of the risk management, to 
improve independence and quality of prudential regulation/supervision and to increase 
accountability of supervisors. 
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